Especially when you take a trip into family court with your friendly neighborhood cps employee(s)!!

Map Courtesy of Digital Map Store
There are 39 counties in the U.S. state of Washington. Washington was carved out of the western part of Washington Territory and admitted to the Union as the 42nd state in 1889. The first counties were created from unorganized territory in 1845.

Certain residents of Snohomish County consider themselves to be part of Freedom County. Freedom County has elected county officials, but is not officially recognized by Snohomish County, the state of Washington, or the federal government.

Washington's FIPS state code is 53.

In order to get better organized, please state what county you live in; I've included the list of the 39 countied in WA under 'Notes," I would like ya'll to add the county you live in under "group," or let me know, and I'll create a group for the county where you have your cps case; I will also list offices and would appreciate if you'd place your story on your page, as well as a list of cps workers, lawyers, judges, non profit personal, all who worked your cps case, thanks, Lisa

LINK TO:

Fighting Child Protective Services False Accusations

I WAS LOOKING THRU COURT DECISIONS (NICE THAT WASINGTON STATE COURTS HAVE THIS OPTION ONLINE) i AM LISTING THE LINKS THAT I HAD USED WHEN I CAME ACROSS THE CASE OF A DISGRUNTLED CPS SUPERVISOR THAT SUED DHS FOR SUSPENDING HIM FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND RACE DISCRIMINATION AT THE WORKPLACE:
THE LINKS ARE PRESENTED IN ORDER, THEN THE APPELLATE CASE/DECISION:

I was searching for info on Adams County,
http://www.mrsc.org/countyprofiles/countyprofile.aspx?id=1
and clicked to "Legal Research" (first tap on left), and was brought to following page:

TO SEARCH FOR COURT CASES HEARD IN COUNTY OF ADAMS, WHICH ARE PUBLISHED IN THE STATE'S REPORTS
http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/template.htm;jsessionid=04A40B21D3E99757DA4F2148F7EBFBE6?view=main

THE CASE, from the link:
http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/template.htm?view=mainresults

Wn. App. 212, JOHNSON v. DSHS
[No. 17336-1-II. Division Two. January 2, 1996.]
VONNIE JOHNSON, Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, ET AL., Respondents.

[1] Civil Rights - Employment Discrimination - Proof - Burden of Proof - Shifting Burdens of Production - Plaintiff's Second Burden - In General. In an employment discrimination action in which the claimant presents a prima facie case of disparate treatment on the basis of race and the employer presents sufficient evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the conduct giving rise to the claim, in order to avoid summary judgment, the claimant must present sufficient evidence that would allow the trier of fact to infer that the employer's reason is a mere pretext for intentional discrimination.

[2] Civil Rights - Employment Discrimination - Disparate Treatment - Rebuttal of Defense - Different Discipline for Same Conduct. In an action alleging employment discrimination on the basis of disparate treatment, evidence that another employee, not belonging to the protected class to which the claimant belongs and performing equivalent duties to those performed by the claimant, committed acts of comparable seriousness to those committed by the claimant, but was not demoted or similarly disciplined, raises an inference that the employer's reason for the conduct giving rise to the claim was a mere pretext for intentional discrimination, thus establishing a jury question on the discrimination claim.

[3] Civil Rights - Employment Discrimination - Intent - Question of Law or Fact. Intent to discriminate is a pure question of fact.

[4] Civil Rights - Employment Discrimination - Disparate Treatment - Rebuttal of Defense - Competing Inferences - Question of Law or Fact. An employee claiming employment discrimination on the basis of disparate treatment may demonstrate that the employer's reason for the conduct giving rise to the claim is a mere pretext for intentional discrimination by either direct or indirect evidence, including evidence presented as part of the prima facie case. Where the evidence creates reasonable but competing inferences of both discrimination and nondiscrimination, a factual question for the jury is raised and summary judgment is inappropriate.

[5] Public Employment - Emotional Distress - Elements - Duty - Scope - Workplace Disputes. The State does not owe its employees the duty to avoid infliction of emotional distress when responding to employment disputes.

[6] Civil Rights - Employment Discrimination - Emotional

Jan. 1996 JOHNSON v. DSHS 213
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

Distress - Damages Recoverable. An employee may recover damages for emotional distress in a discrimination claim.

Nature of Action: A state employee disciplined for allegations of sexual harassment and age discrimination sought damages from the State for racial discrimination and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Superior Court: The Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 92-2-00543-9, Terry D. Sebring, J., on June 18, 1993, entered a summary judgment dismissing the action.

Court of Appeals: Holding that evidence presented by the employee that a Caucasian employee performing equivalent duties was not similarly disciplined for committing misconduct of comparable seriousness raised the inference that the State's reason for the disparate treatment of the employee was pretextual and that summary judgment on the claim of racial discrimination was improper, the court affirms the judgment in part, reverses the judgment in part, and remands for further proceedings.

Elizabeth P. Martin and Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Peterson & Daheim, for appellant.

Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, and Jeffrey A.O. Freimund, Assistant, for respondents.

HOUGHTON, A.C.J. - Vonnie Johnson appeals the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of his claims of racial discrimination, under RCW 49.60, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Johnson filed these claims against the State of Washington, the Department of Social & Health Services (DSHS), and certain DSHS employees, after

214 JOHNSON v. DSHS Jan. 1996
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

he was demoted from (and eventually reinstated to) his supervisory position for alleged sexual harassment and age discrimination. Johnson was demoted even though no formal complaint of sexual harassment or age discrimination was filed, and even though a Caucasian supervisor accused of sexual harassment was only given 90 days' reduced pay. Johnson also contends the trial court erred in refusing to consider certain evidence presented for the first time at his motion for reconsideration. We affirm the trial court's summary judgment of dismissal of the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, but reverse the trial court's dismissal of the discrimination claim and remand for trial.

FACTS

Johnson, an African-American in his midfifties, became a level I Investigator in the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) at DSHS in 1976. Johnson rose to a supervisory position in 1981, where he served until he was placed on the Reduction In Force (RIF) Register due to cutbacks in 1985; this meant he had priority in hiring. While Johnson was on the RIF Register, the chief of OSI retired; regional supervisor Mike Smith became chief; and another individual, a Caucasian male Investigator I (the comparator),



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 "The comparator" was the Caucasian male employed by OSI in a similar position to Johnson, who was also accused of sexual harassment, but received different treatment. All records regarding the individual identified as the comparator were sealed below via stipulated protective order. Although we have carefully considered these records, we address them in this opinion in a general manner, and only to the extent necessary to make our analysis clear.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


was appointed by Smith as acting regional supervisor in Region VI (Tacoma). Six months later, when it became time to appoint a permanent supervisor for Region VI, the comparator was initially appointed.

Johnson challenged this appointment because employees on the RIF Register have priority in hiring. Johnson was then appointed OSI Regional Supervisor of Region VI in 1988, displacing the comparator. It is unchallenged

Jan. 1996 JOHNSON v. DSHS 215
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

that Johnson was the only African-American supervisor in OSI.

It is also unchallenged that Johnson received positive personnel reports during his tenure in this position, that his region was the most successful and productive in the state, and that he was never demoted, suspended, discharged or otherwise disciplined prior to the incident herein. In the last review before the problems involved herein began, the following was stated:

Performance as a Supervisor

You have set an example of excellence for your staff by volunteering and serving on many other projects, accepting assignments willingly and working hard on them. . .. You operate through subtle monitoring to ensure efficiency and quality. You are liked and respected by your staff and the other members of this organization. You have demonstrated your ability to function as an empathetic supervisor, while eliciting exceptional performance from your staff. . ..

This August 1990 review was signed by J. M. (Mike) Smith, as evaluating supervisor, and by Leslie F. (Les) James, as "reviewer." Later reviews leave the "Performance as a Supervisor" portion blank (presumably because Johnson was removed from supervisory duties during this time), but they continue to be above average to excellent in all other areas. They also continue to "recommend promotion" and to include personal commendations for the outstanding manner in which Johnson conducted himself during the investigations discussed below.

On September 4, 1990, Johnson's secretary, Delores Nye, submitted a letter of resignation to Smith. This letter begins, "[t]he problem in the office has been with Loretta [Largen] and her failing to enter the correct time on her leave request sheets." Largen was a clerk/typist in Johnson's office. Nye's letter discusses various improper acts by Largen, and Johnson's "preferential treatment" of Largen. She mentions an incident wherein she confronted Johnson regarding his entering three and one-half hours

216 JOHNSON v. DSHS Jan. 1996
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

on Largen's leave slip, instead of the four hours Nye asserted Largen missed; another employee overheard this exchange and apparently told Largen. Largen complained to Johnson, and Johnson held a meeting in which Nye felt Johnson unfairly focused on her. She also notes that "this incident should [not] have been entered on [her] evaluation."«2»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«2» Nye's August 1990 evaluation does not, however, mention this incident. The evaluation is largely above average to excellent, but does say Nye only "meets normal requirements" with regard to personal relations.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Finally, Nye states Johnson "is not a good manager" because he deals with employees in a "sarcastic, denigrading [sic] and humiliating" manner. After noting she "just wanted [Smith] to know that this has been going on for the past 1 1/2 years," she enclosed her resignation. Nye resigned although she was very close to retirement.

On the same day, September 4, 1990, Smith wrote a letter regarding Nye's "exit interview" to Les James. Smith stated Nye had been "harassed" by Johnson. Smith notes Nye was "shaking and upset." No specifics constituting sexual or age harassment are mentioned by Smith; rather, he states "[n]umerous other incidents, administrative in nature, were discussed by Ms. Nye at the exit interview." The letter focuses largely on Largen, and on Johnson's failure to discipline or properly supervise her. Smith also notes that Nye, who was once Smith's secretary, was afraid of Largen.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 The State asserts Smith's letter indicates Smith "wondered if Johnson was involved in . . . anonymous [hang-up] phone calls[, which Nye received in the middle of the night,] because of [Johnson] and Largen's possible relationship." But, our review of the letter discloses that Nye "believes this is Loretta calling," and says nothing about Johnson's possible involvement.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


He therefore calls for a "6.01 employee investigation,"



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4 Policy 6.01 concerns criminal investigations, including "misuse of state funds," and requires compliance with Personnel Policies 545 and 546. Policy 6.02 concerns allegations of sexual harassment, and also requires such compliance. Policies 545 and 546 concern employee misconduct investigations, and require initiation of a Personnel Conduct Review (PCR) process within 14 days, and completion within 30 days after the employee's response, unless policy 6.01 is invoked, which tolls the PCR time limits.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


but does not specify the subject or object of the investigation. At this point, investigations of

Jan. 1996 JOHNSON v. DSHS 217
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

Johnson for criminal acts, sexual harassment, and age discrimination were begun.

Three days later, September 7, 1990, Smith entered a memorandum "for [the] record" concerning "allegations against Vonnie Johnson."«5»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«5» At page 28 of his deposition, Smith testified that prior to writing this memo, he talked with Pat Nelson, OSI's personnel officer, about Nye's allegations. On the next page of the deposition, page 29, he testified he told Nelson everything he put in the memo. In the record submitted to the trial court, these pages are separated by pages 32-33 of the deposition. At deposition pages 32-33, Smith as- serts he thought criminal activity might have occurred because (1) Johnson and Largen might have conspired to constructively discharge Nye, or (2) Johnson may have paid Largen for time she was not working. The State's brief to this court asserts Smith told Nelson which acts he thought were criminal. This mis- ordering of the pages in the record creates a false impression. A proper ordering of the pages makes clear that Smith was not referring to his conversation with Nelson when he attempted to explain what conduct he thought was criminal.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


This memorandum states the above allegations in greater detail, and adds new allegations, which Nye allegedly made during the exit interview. The new allegations against Johnson included (1) that he had lengthy conversations about "explicit sexual acts" on the phone with "some female," which "horrified, sickened, upset and disappointed" Nye; (2) that he stood in his doorway in front of Nye's desk, looking "down the hallway at the ladies from the State Patrol Organized Crime Unit, making sexual comments about them and rubbing the fly on his pants," which "humiliated, embarrassed and hurt [Nye] and caused her tremendous stress"; (3) that he made "cutting, cruel, mean and vicious" comments to Nye, including "'You're old and fat and ugly. Why don't you just leave so I can get a pretty young thing in here.'" Smith also states Nye found the "sexual overtones" in the office "simply stifling."

Smith's memorandum further states that a policy 6.01 criminal investigation had been initiated concerning Johnson, but again does not specify its objective. He also notes he met with Bob Conner, Director of DSHS Employee Services, as required by policy 6.01, and they agreed that the Office of Equal Opportunity (OEO) should handle the investigation of the "sex and age discrimination" allegations.

218 JOHNSON v. DSHS Jan. 1996
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

Conner testified in his deposition that OEO is the subdivision of his department that ordinarily investigates discrimination allegations.

Despite the assignment of the harassment investigations to OEO, Smith notes that Jan Pfundheller, an OSI investigator, was immediately assigned to interview various persons regarding the sexual harassment charges. Pfundheller reported that Stan Aston, Commander of the Washington State Patrol (WSP) Narcotics Unit adjacent to Johnson's OSI office, said, "[E]very one of [the female employees in the Unit] has complained about the black guy who runs the [adjacent OSI] office. . .."«6»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«6» Commander Aston denied ever making this statement in his testimony at a subsequent Personnel Board hearing, stating he "d[id]n't believe that would have been a true statement." Rather, only one complaint had been made, by Susan Holman to Lt. Broome, for whom she worked. She said she was embarrassed by Johnson's "compliments" to her, stating she "look[ed] good," so Lt. Broome asked Johnson "to be cautious of the way he approached her and the things that he said." Johnson then told Holman "I don't care what [Lt. Broome] says, if I want to compliment you and think that you look very nice, I'm going to compliment you." Johnson testified to a similar version, noting further that when he told Holman about Lt. Broome's comment, she said "'Lieutenant Broome doesn't tell me who I can talk to.'"

In her testimony before the Personnel Board, Holman (1) described her initial relationship with Johnson as "[c]ordial"; (2) stated she would converse briefly with him when she would go down the hall to the bathroom between the offices and directly down the hall from Johnson's office; (3) stated Johnson sometimes "embarrassed" her by looking her up and down and saying she "look[ed] very good"; (4) stated she "casual[ly]" mentioned her embarrassment to Lt. Broome; (5) stated she did not think Johnson was attempting to "pick up on" her; and (6) stated Johnson never made "sexual like comments" to her.

Pfundheller's notes also reflect Aston told her that Lt. Broome told Johnson to stop harassing "the women" in the WSP office; again, Aston says this is false.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


At this time Pfundheller was under the direct supervision and control of the comparator, the Caucasian supervisor whose job Johnson had taken; she therefore would make her final report regarding Johnson to the comparator.

Also, on September 7, 1990, Les James authorized Employee Services Director Conner to conduct a policy 6.01 investigation "relative to Vonnie Johnson and Loretta Largent [sic]." James' letter to Conner states, "Obviously, sexual and racial issues are involved and. . .your staff. . . should be doing the primary investigation." The same

Jan. 1996 JOHNSON v. DSHS 219
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

day, Conner sent James' memorandum to Myron Toyama, acting chief of the OEO, asking him to "initite [sic] an OEO investigation as you deem necessary." There was also a memorandum from Conner to Toyama dated September 10, 1990, stating "Mike [Smith] wants you to go first."

Toyama asked Jeri Van Dyk, an OEO investigator with extensive experience in discrimination investigations, to investigate Johnson. Van Dyk was told OSI would investigate "potential criminal allegations." She discovered, however, that Pfundheller had already spoken with most of the witnesses regarding the harassment issues, so she initially met with Pfundheller.«7»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«7» Pfundheller's investigation notes indicate she extensively questioned numerous persons regarding the harassment charges beginning on September 6, 1990. Johnson's counsel moved below to strike all of Pfundheller's handwritten notes, however, because they are unsworn notes based entirely on hearsay and unsupported by affidavit. This motion was granted. This material has therefore not been considered by this court.

Subsequent WSP summaries of Pfundheller's notes were attached to Johnson's response below. Although these would seem as unreliable as Pfundheller's notes, Johnson's reliance on them below waived any objection as to them. See also Pfundheller's September 14, 1990 summary of her handwritten notes, which again was attached to Johnson's motion below and, therefore, is not objectionable.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Pfundheller gave Van Dyk the impression Johnson had engaged in "serious, extreme, widespread misconduct." Van Dyk then interviewed over 20 witnesses, not including Nye.

Van Dyk concluded Johnson did not commit sexual harassment. She noted several specific allegations in her declaration:

(1) Johnson did not create a hostile work environment at the WSP, notwithstanding Commander Aston's alleged statement that all of the female WSP employees had complained about "the black guy,"«8»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«8» As noted above, Aston denied making such a statement, and stated such a statement would be false if made.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


because none of them told Van Dyk her work environment was altered by Johnson.

(2) One of the allegations regarded Johnson's prior State employment, and was made by Helen Holm (LaBrie), who had worked for a private company, Teller Training Institute,

220 JOHNSON v. DSHS Jan. 1996
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

located in a building in which Johnson had previously worked. According to LaBrie's testimony, Johnson "check[ed] her out," and one time grabbed her for a "millisecond"; she told him to stop and he did so; he never again attempted to grab her; moreover, she told Johnson's supervisor, Marty Manning, she could handle the situation. LaBrie did not work for the State or Johnson.

(3) Another allegation regarded Diane Weedon, who worked for Johnson as a clerk/typist at the OSI office from April to August 1988. She stated once when she was late for work, Johnson asked her if she had been up all night having "wild sex" with her husband. On three occasions Johnson rubbed her shoulders and began rubbing down her back, but she moved away; she never told him this bothered her. She never filed a complaint. After she left Johnson's office, he called her numerous times, asking to meet for lunch, which she did on two occasions, along with other employees. On the second occasion, Weedon alleges Johnson said "not that I think you're attractive or anything, I like you, and would you . . . go to bed with me or would you sleep with me" when they were alone together. She declined, and Johnson did not pursue her thereafter. Van Dyk notes Johnson was neither Weedon's supervisor nor her co-worker when this conversation allegedly occurred. Nor is there any evidence Weedon's employment was affected in any way by any of these incidents.

(4) Having interviewed seven women employed at the WSP Narcotics Unit adjacent to Johnson's office, Van Dyk met with Lt. Broome on October 2, 1990, "to express to him [her] concern that the interviews of his employees did not support a finding of a hostile work environment and were directly contradictory [both] to what she had understood from Jan Pfundheller and to Mike Smith's memo to the file. The purpose of [the] meeting was to determine if there was any reason why [Broome's] employees would not be truthful. . .."

On October 18, 1990, as Van Dyk was preparing to write her findings, Toyama instructed her to discontinue working on the investigation. According to Van Dyk, she had never before been asked to terminate an investigation, and knows of no other time before or since when anyone

Jan. 1996 JOHNSON v. DSHS 221
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

in OEO was asked to do so. She was given no explanation. Although she was not asked to evaluate racial issues during her investigation, she "had some concerns during [her] investigation that Mr. Johnson's race may have played a factor." She noted Les James' observation that "'racial issues'" were involved, Smith's incorrect portrayal of Commander Aston's statements regarding "'the black guy,'" and two unidentified DSHS employees' opinions that Nye "had a problem with" Johnson's race.

On September 13, 1990, Johnson was "reassigned" to his residence pending completion of a 6.01 investigation regarding allegations of misconduct, "including sexual harassment alleged by a number of individuals." He was forbidden to return to or contact anyone at his office, was required to remain in his home during normal business hours, and was required to be available by telephone.

Pfundheller called Johnson on September 24, 1990, and asked him to appear at OSI headquarters on the afternoon of September 28, 1990, for an interview. Van Dyk called Johnson on September 26, 1990; they made an appointment to meet on the morning of September 28, 1990.

At his meeting with Van Dyk, Johnson learned for the first time the specific nature of the allegations against him. At Johnson's afternoon meeting with Pfundheller, however, she would not give Johnson the specifics of the allegations. She read Johnson his Miranda«9»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«9» Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R. 3d 974 (1966).


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


warnings, which he refused to sign, and then he left.

After this, and after Van Dyk informed WSP Lt. Broome that she found no evidence of harassment, the Deputy Secretary for Management at DSHS, Robert Benson, met with Bob Connor and Les James and determined that Pfundheller's OSI investigation of Johnson might constitute a conflict of interest. In an attempt to "ensure an unbiased investigation," Benson ordered that the investigation be turned over to the WSP.

222 JOHNSON v. DSHS Jan. 1996
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

The WSP Department of Internal Affairs received Pfundheller's existing file on October 5, 1990. The WSP investigators reviewed Pfundheller's files, summarized them, and reinterviewed six of the 20 witnesses: Diane Weedon, Susan Holman, Don Russel,«10»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«10» Don Russel, who was an investigator in Johnson's office, gave testimony wholly favorable to Johnson. The WSP investigator largely discounted his testimony.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Kip Johnson,«11»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«11» Kip Johnson was Stan Aston's secretary. Before the Personnel Board, she testified she never spoke with Johnson except to say "hi"; Johnson never harassed her; he would stand at the end of the hallway looking, and when she would come down the hall to the bathroom, he would turn around and go into his office; and he never made any comments toward her.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Don Gregory«12»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«12» Don Gregory, another OSI investigator and an old friend of Johnson's from the military, attended the lunch with Diane Weedon after which Johnson allegedly propositioned her, but did not hear or see any improper behavior during their lunch.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


and Delores Nye. On October 25, 1990, the head of the investigation, George Wehnes, sent copies of the report to both the comparator and Deputy Secretary Benson with a notation that "There are some obvious holes in this investigation, but I don't think they are detrimental to the case . . . the evidence is sufficient for Johnson to be interviewed." The WSP interviewed Johnson on November 20, 1990. Johnson denied each of the allegations«13»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«13» The other allegation not mentioned to this point concerned Shelly Denny, who was secretary to the manager of a different region, when she attended a lunch with Johnson and several other people in July 1990. Johnson allegedly offered to pay for her lunch, took her money and placed it in his pocket, and said she would have to reach in his pocket to get it back. He eventually gave her back the money. The incident made her uncomfortable because she felt the other, younger investigators present might think they could treat her the same way. She did not report the incident. Denny did work for Johnson for one month some time after this incident and experienced no problems with Johnson.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


against him. The WSP eventually forwarded its summary report, without reaching any conclusions, on December 21, 1990.

On January 2, 1991, Smith sent Conner copies of the completed WSP and OSI reports.«14»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«14» Despite a prior finding by Deputy Secretary Benson that Pfundheller's investigation involved a conflict of interest, it appears her report was relied upon in the following actions taken by DSHS.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Neither report found any substantiation of the purported criminal activities regarding "[m]isuse of state time." Pfundheller's report

Jan. 1996 JOHNSON v. DSHS 223
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

did, however, find that Johnson sexually harassed women employed by DSHS and WSP; harassed Nye due to her age; violated a policy regarding reporting of outside work;«15»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«15» Largen had a night job as a janitor, which Johnson told her she did not have to report because it did not conflict with her State employment.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


and violated the confidentiality of DSHS cases and the privacy of DSHS clients by allowing Largen's 13-year-old daughter to photocopy files for her mother.

Nonetheless, Smith and his deputy chief, Bruce Baker, met with Johnson and the attorney who then represented him to tell Johnson he would be reinstated on January 8, 1991. Smith's notes of the meeting state Johnson was told that "[p]erhaps" he did not engage in sexual harassment, but he did upset some of the women involved. Smith further notes he would write a PCR, but not ask for termination or demotion. Smith's notes also indicate that he did not promise that no disciplinary action would be taken and that Johnson was told it was "[r]easonable to anticipate some action" following the PCR.

Johnson returned to his Regional Supervisor position the next day, January 9, 1991, nearly four months after he was first placed on home assignment. The same day, he received three PCRs.«16»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«16» Ultimately, it appears four PCRs were filed, corresponding to the four findings in Pfundheller's report regarding (1) Johnson making "personal sexual comments" to employees, "rubbing his crotch," and touching an employee of DSHS and a private company; (2) Johnson allowing Largen's 13-year-old daughter to photocopy files; (3) Johnson allowing Largen to take time off without requiring proper leave slips; and (4) Johnson making inappropriate and degrading comments to Nye regarding her age and retirement.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Prior to this, Johnson's only information regarding the allegations against him had come from Van Dyk, and he was "surprised" by the PCRs because no female employee of his had ever told him he had offended her. Johnson responded to the PCRs in writing, noting that most of the harassment allegations regarded women not under his supervision or even employed by DSHS; that those few who were employed by DSHS did not file complaints or even tell him they were offended; that the misuse of funds allegations were found unsupported by both investigations; and that Nye's allegations

224 JOHNSON v. DSHS Jan. 1996
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

arose from his joking that she should retire, to which she would say "'Oh, so you could hire a young, cute blond secretary?'," to which he would reply "'I don't like blonds.'"

The PCRs were referred for review to Richard Verme, Manager of the Medical Audit Team, who agreed with the two PCRs involving sexual harassment«17»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«17» Regarding employees of Johnson's, Verme cites to the statements of Nye and Weedon, discussed above, and to those of Viki Coan and Kathy White. Coan, who was a secretary for another investigator in Johnson's office, subsequently testified at the Personnel Review Board hearing that Johnson "check his zipper" often, which did not offend her, but if it offended others, he should stop. White, who did not work "for or with" Johnson as Verme asserts, but rather was a Criminal Intelligence Analyst at WSP down the hall, testified at the subsequent hearing that Johnson never did anything to offend her, but that he occasionally did a "package check" (apparently, she described this as a military term for a man adjusting his genitals through his clothing). This action did not offend White.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


and age discrimination, and the one regarding breach of confidentiality, but found the PCR regarding misuse of state time unsubstantiated. Based upon this report, DSHS demoted Johnson from his supervisory Investigator 3 position to an Investigator 1 position on February 21, 1991, effective March 11, 1991.

Johnson appealed to the Personnel Appeals Board. Initially, he challenged the sufficiency of the letter demoting him. On November 20, 1991, over eight months after his demotion, the Board set aside the demotion due to DSHS's failure to give Johnson the specifics of the allegations. The Board ordered DSHS to reinstate Johnson with full back pay and benefits. Six days later, November 26, 1991, DSHS issued a more complete letter, again demoting Johnson. This letter relied completely on Pfundheller's investigation.

Johnson again appealed to the Personnel Appeals Board. After a contested hearing, at which most of the witnesses testified in person or by testimonial deposition, the Board entered findings of fact. The findings largely contradicted DSHS's assertions and concluded that DSHS failed to substantiate its assertions that Johnson's conduct constituted

Jan. 1996 JOHNSON v. DSHS 225
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

cause for discipline. Johnson was again ordered reinstated to an Investigator 3 position with full back pay and benefits on July 24, 1992. DSHS did not appeal this determination.

Smith apparently refused to reinstate Johnson to his supervisor position in Region VI, which had been given to the comparator.«18»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«18» DSHS does not challenge these assertions.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Instead, DSHS created a new position for Johnson as manager of the Food Stamp Trafficking Control Unit, with only three persons under his supervision (compared to 11 at Region VI) and no personal secretary. This makes Johnson the only manager in OSI without a personal secretary.

For purposes of Johnson's race discrimination claim, Johnson's treatment must be compared with that of the comparator. After an OSI investigation, during which the comparator was placed on home assignment for one and one-half months, OSI concluded that the comparator had sexually harassed and retaliated against a subordinate, and had used discriminatory practices with other employees. OEO also conducted an investigation and concluded that the comparator's conduct did not constitute sexual harassment under its guidelines. The WSP was never asked to participate in the investigation of the comparator.

A PCR was initiated against the comparator. As a result, the comparator was given 90 days' reduced pay. Although, the disciplinary letter states that the comparator would not be reassigned to supervisory duties, the comparator testified by deposition that during the 90-day reduced pay period he was never removed from supervisory duties, was not demoted, and did not change duties except that he no longer supervised the sexually harassed employee. Moreover, DSHS does not contradict Johnson's assertion that the comparator was given Johnson's job.

Johnson filed his complaint on January 16, 1992. DSHS moved for summary judgment of dismissal. The trial court

226 JOHNSON v. DSHS Jan. 1996
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

granted DSHS's motion. Johnson moved for reconsideration. Numerous documents were submitted by both parties. The trial court declined to consider additional evidence, and affirmed its ruling. Johnson appeals.

ANALYSIS

This court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court when reviewing a summary judgment, construing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably to the nonmoving party. Sellsted v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank, 69 Wn. App. 852, 857, 851 P.2d 716, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1018 (1993). Summary judgment should only be upheld if no genuine issues of material fact are presented, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56. It has been noted that summary judgment should rarely be granted in employment discrimination cases. deLisle v. FMC Corp., 57 Wn. App. 79, 84, 786 P.2d 839 (reversing summary judgment in age discrimination case due to issues of fact), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1026 (1990) (citing Hillebrand v. M-Tron Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989)).

[1, 2] RCW 49.60.180 establishes that discrimination on the basis of race by an employer is an unfair practice. Specifically, employers may not discriminate against "any person in . . . terms or conditions of employment because of . . . race. . .." RCW 49.60.180(3).«19»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«19» The 1993 amendment to RCW 49.60.180, Laws of Wash. 1993 ch. 510, § 12, changing the term "handicap" to "disability" has no impact on the statute's applicability in the instant case.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination due to disparate treatment, as Johnson claims here, he must show DSHS "'simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race. . ..'" Shannon v. Pay N' Save Corp., 104 Wn.2d 722, 726, 709 P.2d 799 (1985) (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 n.15, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396

Jan. 1996 JOHNSON v. DSHS 227
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

(1977). Johnson must show (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was treated less favorably in the terms or conditions of his employment (3) than a similarly situated, nonprotected employee,«20»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«20» DSHS argues Johnson must show "he was intentionally treated differently, due to his race, from a similarly situated non-black employee whose conduct was of comparable seriousness," citing generally, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). This is incorrect. The purpose of showing disparate treatment is to create an inference of discriminatory animus because direct evidence of discrimination is rarely available. Cf. Carle v. McChord Credit Union, 65 Wn. App. 93, 827 P.2d 1070 (1992) (affirming denial of directed verdict where no direct evidence of discriminatory intent was presented). Therefore, Johnson is not required to show both that he was treated differently from a similarly situated Caucasian and that the different treatment was based on race; if he could show negative treatment based on race, he would not need to show how other persons were treated. Cf. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 ("Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment").


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


and (4) he and the nonprotected "comparator" were doing substantially the same work; if DSHS then proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action (here, Johnson's alleged misconduct), then (5) Johnson must produce evidence indicating DSHS's reason is pretextual. See, e.g., Ellingson v. Spokane Mortgage Co., 19 Wn. App. 48, 54, 573 P.2d 389 (1978); see also Jones v. Kitsap County Sanitary Landfill, Inc., 60 Wn. App. 369, 371, 803 P.2d 841 (1991); see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) (seminal case establishing general burden shifting framework).«21»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«21» The McDonnell Douglas factors should be used flexibly to address the facts in different cases. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) (McDonnell Douglas burden shifting should be used flexibly to meet different fact situations; burden to show prima facie case "is not onerous"); Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 363, 753 P.2d 517 (1988) (McDonnell Douglas test to be used flexibly, or not at all). However, the McDonnell Douglas test need not be used, if it makes the analysis needlessly complex, or if the plaintiff chooses some other method to meet the burden of producing evidence that would allow the factfinder to find unlawful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Parsons v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 70 Wn. App. 804, 809, 856 P.2d 702 (1993).


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


One test for pretext is whether (1) an employee outside the protected class (2) committed acts of comparable seriousness (3) but was not demoted or similarly disciplined. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 26 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 1994).

228 JOHNSON v. DSHS Jan. 1996
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

The first element is not in dispute. Johnson is an African-American who had high performance ratings both before and after this incident. Nor is the second element seriously disputed, because Johnson's demotion two levels and removal from supervisory duties was obviously distinct from the comparator's $600 pay loss.«22»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«22» While Johnson does not expressly argue the point, it is equally clear he has been treated differently from the comparator regarding subsequent assignments: The record indicates Johnson was given a limited supervisory position (three people) and no personal secretary, while the comparator was given Johnson's prior position (in which Johnson supervised 11 persons), and no other supervisor is without a secretary.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


DSHS argued below, however, and the trial court agreed, that the comparator and Johnson were not similarly situated in all respects. While DSHS does not dispute the fourth element, that Johnson and the comparator performed equivalent duties, it does argue that the acts for which Johnson and the comparator were disciplined were not "of comparable seriousness" as a matter of law.

This phrase originated in McDonnell Douglas, which, in analyzing "pretext," stated:

Especially relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts . . . of comparable seriousness to the [African-American plaintiff's acts] were nevertheless retained or rehired. [A discrimination defendant] may justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all races.

411 U.S. at 804. The Supreme Court has further noted that,

as we indicated in McDonnell Douglas, an allegation that other "employees involved in acts against [the employer] of comparable seriousness . . . were nevertheless retained . . ." is adequate to plead an inferential case that the employer's reliance on his discharged employee's misconduct as grounds for terminating him was merely a pretext.

Jan. 1996 JOHNSON v. DSHS 229
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.11, 96 S. Ct. 2574, 2580 n.11, 49 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1976).

[3, 4] Ultimately, however, "'the question of an employer's intent to discriminate is "a pure question of fact."'" Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 1985), as amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (1986) (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1789-90, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1982))); cf. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2753-54, 2756, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993) (existence of intentional discrimination is ultimately a question of fact). Therefore,

Even if the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment decision, thus shifting the burden to the plaintiff to prove that the articulated reason is pretextual, summary judgment is normally inappropriate.

Merced, 934 F.2d at 1111; see also Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994) (clarifying Merced). This is because pretext may be demonstrated by direct or indirect evidence, including evidence presented as part of the prima facie case. Carle v. McChord Credit Union, 65 Wn. App. 93, 102, 827 P.2d 1070 (1992). Where the evidence creates "reasonable but competing inferences of both discrimination and nondiscrimination," a factual question for the jury exists. Carle, 65 Wn. App. at 102 (citing United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 845, 112 S. Ct. 141, 116 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1991)). In this case Johnson's evidence regarding the comparator "'necessarily ha[s] raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the legitimacy or bona fides of the employer's articulated reason for its employment decision.'" Merced, 934 F.2d at 1111 (quoting Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009); see also Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889-90.

Applying these concepts to this case, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. While

230 JOHNSON v. DSHS Jan. 1996
80 Wn. App. 212, 907 P.2d 1223

some distinctions could be drawn between the behavior of the comparator and Johnson, they are insufficient to defeat a reasonable inference that Johnson was disciplined in part due to race. In cases involving race, as in those involving age,

The ultimate issue . . . is whether age [or race] was a determining factor in the employer's decision. . .. [T]he employees's task at the summary judgment stage is limited to showing that a reasonable trier of fact could, but not necessarily would, draw the inference that age [or race] was a determining factor in the decision.

Sellsted, 69 Wn. App. at 860.«23»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«23» After oral argument in the present case, the Supreme Court issued a decision holding that to prevail on a claim under RCW 49.60.180(2), a claimant must now prove that any of the statutory attributes was a "substantial factor" in the adverse employment decision, as opposed to a "determining factor." Mackay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., 127 Wn.2d 302, 310, 898 P.2d 284 (1995).


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Turning summary judgment on such narrow questions as the distinction between the behavior of the comparator and Johnson defeats the fundamental concept of allowing discrimination claims to be decided on the merits.

Our holding renders the arguments regarding the trial court's refusal to consider additional evidence on reconsideration moot. In addition, Johnson is entitled to attorney fees. RCW 49.60.030(2); Carle, 65 Wn. App. at 110-11.

[5, 6] Johnson also challenges the trial court's dismissal of his negligent infliction of mental distress claim. Another division of this court has recently ruled the State does not owe a duty to avoid infliction of emotional distress on its employees when responding to employment disputes. Bishop v. State, 77 Wn. App. 228, 234-35, 889 P.2d 959 (1995). In the absence of a duty, there is no cause of action. The trial court's analysis tracks DSHS's position, and is sound. Moreover, emotional distress is compensable in a discrimination action, Johnson's only claim, so

Dec. 1995 STATE v. MILLS 231
80 Wn. App. 231, 907 P.2d 316

Johnson does not need to rely on negligent infliction of emotional distress.«24»



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

«24» After oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court issued a decision again recognizing that emotional distress is compensable in a discrimination claim. See Goodman v. Boeing Co., 127 Wn.2d 401, 407, 899 P.2d 1265 (1995).


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


The trial court's summary judgment of dismissal of Johnson's discrimination claims is reversed and remanded for trial on race discrimination. The trial court's summary judgment of dismissal of the negligent infliction of mental distress is affirmed.

MORGAN and COX, JJ., concur.

SO, this is a case from 1996; does this fellow still work at cps in Washington??? And is this an example of how CPS WORKERS and SUPEVISORS get along???

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCE SERVICES POVERTY GUIDELINES, RESOURSE, AND MEAUSREMENT from the webpage: http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/poverty/index.shtml


Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation Search
Poverty Guidelines, Research, and Measurement


Poverty Guidelines
2009 HHS Poverty Guidelines
Prior HHS Poverty Guidelines and Federal Register References
Poverty Guidelines and Poverty Measurement
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the Poverty Guidelines and Poverty
Further Resources on Poverty Measurement, Poverty Lines, and Their History
The Census Bureau's Poverty Home Page — The Census Bureau prepares the statistics on the number of people in poverty in the United States
Poverty Research Centers
ASPE provides or has provided support to the following organizations to conduct and report on research related to poverty:

The National Poverty Center at the University of Michigan
The Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
The Kentucky Center for Poverty Research at the University of Kentucky
The West Coast Poverty Research Center at the University of Washington
The Joint Center for Poverty Research of Northwestern University and the University of Chicago
The RUPRI Rural Poverty Research Center at the University of Missouri
See also the National and Area Poverty Research Centers website.

Are You Looking for …
Poverty guidelines — gross or net income
A chart with percentages (e.g., 125 percent) of the guidelines
The poverty line for a state or city
The number of poor people in a state or city
How the poverty line was developed
Alternative approaches to poverty measurement
ASPE research on poverty
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

WASHINGTON'S STATE LAWS REGARDING CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, CHILD WELFARE

State Statutes Results

Washington
Child Abuse and Neglect
Child Witnesses to Domestic Violence
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Child Witnesses to Domestic Violence: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 222 KB) publication.

Circumstances That Constitute Witnessing
Citation: Rev. Code § 9.94A.535

[In criminal law] A child is a witness to an act of domestic violence if the offense occurred within sight or sound of the victim's or the offender's minor child under age 18.

Consequences
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 9.94A.535; 9.94A.537

It is considered an aggravating circumstance when an act of domestic violence has occurred in the presence of a minor child. Under such circumstance, the court may impose an aggravated sentence that may consist of the maximum allowed under § 9A.20.021 for the underlying conviction.


(Back to Top)

Clergy as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Clergy as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 287 KB) publication.

Citation: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.44.030(7) (LexisNexis through 7/21/07)


Information considered privileged by statute and not directly related to reports required by this section must not be divulged without a valid written waiver of the privilege.

Citation: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.44.060(1)(a), (3) (LexisNexis through 7/21/07)


Any person participating in good faith in the making of a report pursuant to this chapter or testifying as to alleged child abuse or neglect in a judicial proceeding shall in so doing be immune from any liability arising out of such reporting or testifying under any law of this State.
Conduct conforming with reporting requirements shall not be deemed a violation of the confidential communication privilege of §§ 5.60.060 (3) and (4) [pertaining to clergy-penitent and physician-patient privilege], 18.53.200 [pertaining to optometrist-patient privilege], and 18.83.110 [pertaining to psychologist-client privilege].



(Back to Top)

Cross-Reporting Among Responders to Child Abuse and Neglect
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Cross-Reporting Among Responders to Child Abuse and Neglect: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 267 KB) publication.

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.44.030(4), (5) (LexisNexis through 11-8-07)

The department, upon receiving a report of an incident of alleged abuse or neglect involving a child who has died, has had physical injury or injuries inflicted upon him or her other than by accidental means, or who has been subjected to alleged sexual abuse shall report such incident to the proper law enforcement agency. In emergency cases, where the child's welfare is endangered, the department shall notify the proper law enforcement agency within 24 hours after a report is received by the department. In all other cases, the department shall notify the law enforcement agency within 72 hours after a report is received by the department. If the department makes an oral report, a written report shall also be made to the proper law enforcement agency within 5 days thereafter.
Any law enforcement agency receiving a report of an incident of alleged abuse or neglect involving a child who has died, has had physical injury or injuries inflicted upon him or her other than by accidental means, or who has been subjected to alleged sexual abuse shall report such incident in writing as to the proper county prosecutor or city attorney for appropriate action whenever the law enforcement agency's investigation reveals that a crime may have been committed. The law enforcement agency shall also notify the department of all reports received and the law enforcement agency's disposition of them. In emergency cases, where the child's welfare is endangered, the law enforcement agency shall notify the department within 24 hours. In all other cases, the law enforcement agency shall notify the department within 72 hours after a report is received by the law enforcement agency.



(Back to Top)

Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 442 KB) publication.

Physical Abuse
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.44.020; 26.44.030

Abuse or neglect means the injury or maltreatment of a child by any person under circumstances that indicate that the child's health, welfare, and safety are harmed.
Severe abuse means any of the following:

Any single act of abuse that causes physical trauma of sufficient severity that, if left untreated, could cause death
Any single act of sexual abuse that causes significant bleeding, deep bruising, or significant external or internal swelling
More than one act of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising, significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture, or unconsciousness


Neglect
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.44.020; 9A.42.100

Negligent treatment or maltreatment means an act or a failure to act, or the cumulative effects of a pattern of conduct, behavior, or inaction, that evidences a serious disregard of consequences of such magnitude as to constitute a clear and present danger to a child's health, welfare, or safety, including but not limited to conduct prohibited under § 9A.42.100 [endangerment with a controlled substance]. When considering whether a clear and present danger exists, evidence of a parent's substance abuse as a contributing factor to negligent treatment or maltreatment shall be given great weight.
It is endangerment with a controlled substance if the person knowingly or intentionally permits a dependent child to be exposed to, ingest, inhale, or have contact with methamphetamine or ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or anhydrous ammonia, including their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, that are being used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.

Sexual Abuse
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.020

Abuse or neglect means the sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a child by any person under circumstances that indicate that the child's health, welfare, and safety are harmed.

Sexual exploitation includes:

Allowing, permitting, or encouraging a child to engage in prostitution by any person
Allowing, permitting, encouraging, or engaging in the obscene or pornographic photographing, filming, or depicting of a child by any person


Emotional Abuse

This issue is not addressed in the statutes reviewed.

Abandonment

This issue is not addressed in the statutes reviewed.

Standards for Reporting
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.020

A report is required when the child's health, welfare, and safety are harmed.

Persons Responsible for the Child
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.020

Any person can be a responsible person.

Exceptions
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.44.015; 26.44.020

This chapter shall not be construed to authorize interference with child-raising practices, including reasonable parental discipline, that are not injurious to the child's health, welfare, and safety.
Nothing in this chapter may be used to prohibit the reasonable use of corporal punishment as a means of discipline.

No parent or guardian may be deemed abusive or neglectful solely by reason of the parent's or child's blindness, deafness, developmental disability, or other handicap.

The fact that siblings share a bedroom is not, in and of itself, negligent treatment or maltreatment. Poverty, homelessness, or exposure to domestic violence that is perpetrated against someone other than the child does not constitute negligent treatment or maltreatment in and of itself.

A person who is being furnished Christian Science treatment by a duly accredited Christian Science practitioner will not be considered, for that reason alone, a neglected person.



(Back to Top)

Definitions of Domestic Violence
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Definitions of Domestic Violence: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 639 KB) publication.

Defined in Domestic Violence Civil Laws
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.50.010

''Domestic violence'' means:
Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, between family or household members
Sexual assault of one family or household member by another
Stalking, as defined in § 9A.46.110, of one family or household member by another family or household member


Defined in Child Abuse Reporting and Child Protection Laws
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.020(13)

[Effective January 1, 2008]
Poverty, homelessness, or exposure to domestic violence, as defined in § 26.50.010, that is perpetrated against someone other than the child does not constitute negligent treatment or maltreatment in and of itself.

Defined in Criminal Laws
Citation: Rev. Code § 10.99.020

''Domestic violence'' includes, but is not limited to, any of the following crimes when committed by one family or household member against another:

Assault
Driveby shooting
Reckless endangerment
Coercion
Burglary
Criminal trespass
Malicious mischief
Kidnapping
Unlawful imprisonment
Violation of the provisions of a restraining order, no-contact order, or protection order
Rape
Residential burglary
Stalking
Interference with the reporting of domestic violence


Persons Included in the Definition
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 10.99.020; 26.50.010

''Family or household members'' means:
Spouses, domestic partners, former spouses, former domestic partners, or persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time
Adult persons related by blood or marriage
Adult persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past
Persons age 16 or older who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past and who have or have had a dating relationship
Persons age 16 or older with whom a person age 16 or older has or has had a dating relationship
Persons who have a biological or legal parent-child relationship, including stepparents and stepchildren and grandparents and grandchildren
''Dating relationship'' means a social relationship of a romantic nature. Factors that the court may consider in making this determination include:

The length of time the relationship has existed
The nature of the relationship
The frequency of interaction between the parties



(Back to Top)

Disclosure of Confidential Child Abuse and Neglect Records
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Disclosure of Confidential Child Abuse and Neglect Records: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 574 KB) publication.

Confidentiality of Records
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.125

Reports and records are confidential.

Persons or Entities Allowed Access to Records
Rev. Code § 26.44.125

Information about reports, reviews, and hearings may be disclosed only in accordance with Federal and State laws pertaining to child welfare records and child protective services reports.

When Public Disclosure of Records is Allowed

This issue is not addressed in the statutes reviewed.

Use of Records for Employment Screening
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.100

Founded reports of child abuse and neglect may be considered in determining whether the person is disqualified from being licensed to provide child care, employed by a licensed child care agency, or authorized by the department to care for children.


(Back to Top)

Establishment and Maintenance of Central Registries for Child Abuse Reports
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Establishment and Maintenance of Central Registries for Child Abuse Reports: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 310 KB) publication.

Establishment
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.030(15)
Effective October 1, 2008
The State Department of Social and Health Services shall maintain investigation records.

Purpose
Citation:

This issue is not addressed in the statutes reviewed.

Contents
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.030(15)
Effective October 1, 2008

The department shall maintain investigation records and shall maintain a log of screened-out nonabusive cases.

Maintenance
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.44.030(15); 26.44.031
Effective October 1, 2008

The department shall conduct timely and periodic reviews of all founded cases of abuse and neglect.

An unfounded or inconclusive report shall be maintained no longer than 6 years after completion of the investigation, unless a prior or subsequent founded report has been received regarding the child who is the subject of the report, a sibling or half-sibling of the child, or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child.

The department may keep records concerning founded reports of child abuse or neglect as the department determines by rule.



(Back to Top)

Immunity for Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Immunity for Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 174 KB) publication.

Citation: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.44.060(1)-(2), (5) (LexisNexis through 6-30-08)
Statute:
Any person participating in good faith in making a report pursuant to the reporting laws or testifying as to alleged child abuse or neglect in a judicial proceeding shall be immune from any liability arising out of such reporting or testifying.
A person convicted of knowingly making a false report shall not be immune from liability under this subsection.

An administrator of a hospital or similar institution or any licensed physician taking a child into custody pursuant to § 26.44.056 shall not be subject to criminal or civil liability for such taking into custody.

A person who, in good faith and without gross negligence, cooperates in an investigation arising as a result of a report made pursuant to this chapter shall not be subject to civil liability arising out of his or her cooperation. This subsection does not apply to a person who caused or allowed the child abuse or neglect to occur.



(Back to Top)

Making and Screening Reports of Child Abuse and Neglect
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Making and Screening Reports of Child Abuse and Neglect: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 619 KB) publication.

Reporting Procedures

Individual Responsibility
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.030; 26.44.040
When any mandated reporter has reasonable cause to believe that a child has suffered abuse or neglect, he or she shall make a report to the law enforcement agency or to the Department of Social and Health Services.
An oral report shall be made at the first opportunity but no longer than 48 hours after there is reasonable cause. The oral report must be followed by a report in writing.

When any person, in his or her official supervisory capacity with a nonprofit or for-profit organization, has reasonable cause to believe that a child has suffered abuse or neglect caused by a person over whom he or she regularly exercises supervisory authority, he or she shall report such incident, or cause a report to be made, to the proper law enforcement agency, if the person alleged to have caused the abuse or neglect is employed by, contracted by, or volunteers with the organization and coaches, trains, educates, or counsels a child or children or regularly has unsupervised access to a child or children as part of the employment, contract, or voluntary service. No one shall be required to report when he or she obtains the information solely as a result of a privileged communication.

An immediate oral report must be made by telephone or otherwise to the proper law enforcement agency or the Department of Social and Health Services and, upon request, must be followed by a report in writing.

Content of Reports
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.44.030; 26.44.040
The reports must contain the following information, if known:

The name, address, and age of the child
The name and address of the child's parents, stepparents, guardians, or other persons having custody of the child
The nature and extent of alleged injuries, neglect, or sexual abuse
Any evidence of previous injuries, including their nature and extent
Any other information that might be helpful in establishing the cause of the child's death, injury, or injuries, and the identity of the alleged perpetrator or perpetrators


Special Reporting Procedures

Suspicious Deaths
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.030(4), (5)
If the report involves a child who has died:
The department shall notify the proper law enforcement agency.
The law enforcement agency shall report the incident in writing to the proper county prosecutor or city attorney and notify the department.


Substance-Exposed Infants
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.44.170; 26.44.200
When an investigation is made that includes an in-person contact with the person alleged to have committed abuse, there shall be a determination of whether it is probable that the use of alcohol or controlled substances is a contributing factor.
If, in the course of investigating an allegation relating to the manufacture of methamphetamine or possession of ephedrine or any of its salts or isomers or salts of isomers, pseudoephedrine or any of its salts or isomers or salts of isomers, pressurized ammonia gas, or pressurized ammonia gas solution with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, a law enforcement agency discovers that a child is present at the site, the agency shall contact the department immediately.

Screening Reports
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.44.030; 26.44.050
The department, upon receiving a report of alleged abuse or neglect involving a child who has died, physical injury inflicted upon a child by other than accidental means, or alleged sexual abuse, shall report the incident to the law enforcement agency. In emergency cases, where the child's welfare is endangered, the department shall notify the law enforcement agency within 24 hours. In all other cases, the department shall notify the law enforcement agency within 72 hours.

Upon receiving a report of alleged abuse or neglect, the department shall make reasonable efforts to learn the name, address, and telephone number of each person making a report. The department shall provide assurances of appropriate confidentiality of the identification of persons reporting under this section. If the department is unable to learn the information required under this subsection, the department shall only investigate cases in which:

The department believes there is a serious threat of substantial harm to the child.
The report indicates conduct involving a criminal offense that has, or is about to occur, in which the child is the victim.
The department has a prior founded report of abuse or neglect with regard to a member of the household that is within 3 years of receipt of the referral.
For reports of alleged abuse or neglect that are accepted for investigation by the department, the investigation shall be conducted within timeframes established by the department in rule. In no case shall the investigation extend longer than 90 days from the date the report is received, unless a law enforcement agency or prosecuting attorney has determined that a longer investigation period is necessary. At the completion of the investigation, the department shall make a finding that the report of child abuse or neglect is founded or unfounded.


(Back to Top)

Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 633 KB) publication.

Professionals Required to Report
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.030

The following persons are required to report:
Practitioners, county coroners, or medical examiners
Law enforcement officers
Professional school personnel
Registered or licensed nurses, social service counselors, psychologists, or pharmacists
Employees of the Department of Early Learning
Licensed or certified child care providers or their employees
Employees of the department
Juvenile probation officers
Placement and liaison specialists, responsible living skills program staff, or HOPE center staff
State family and children's ombudsman or any volunteer in the ombudsman's office
Persons who supervise employees or volunteers who train, educate, coach, or counsel children or have regular unsupervised access to children
Department of Corrections Personnel
Any adult with whom a child resides


Reporting by Other Persons
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.030

Any person who has reasonable cause to believe that a child has suffered abuse or neglect may report.

Standards for Making a Report
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.030

A report is required when:
A reporter has reasonable cause to believe that a child has suffered abuse or neglect.
Any person, in his or her official supervisory capacity with a nonprofit or for-profit organization, has reasonable cause to believe that a child has suffered abuse or neglect caused by a person over whom he or she regularly exercises supervisory authority.
Department of Corrections personnel observe offenders or the children with whom the offenders are in contact, and as a result of these observations have reasonable cause to believe that a child has suffered abuse or neglect.
Any adult has reasonable cause to believe that a child who resides with them has suffered severe abuse.


Privileged Communications
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.44.030; 26.44.060

A person who supervises employees or volunteers who train, educate, coach, or counsel children or have regular unsupervised access children shall not be required to report when he or she obtains the information solely as a result of a privileged communication.
Information considered privileged by statute and not directly related to reports required by this section must not be divulged without a valid written waiver of the privilege.
Conduct conforming with reporting requirements shall not be deemed a violation of the confidential communication privilege of §§ 5.60.060 (3) and (4) [pertaining to clergy-penitent and physician-patient privilege], 18.53.200 [pertaining to optometrist-patient privilege], and 18.83.110 [pertaining to psychologist-client privilege].


Inclusion of Reporter's Name in Report
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.030

The department shall make reasonable efforts to learn the name, address, and telephone number of the reporter.

Disclosure of Reporter Identity
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.44.030

The department shall provide assurances of appropriate confidentiality of the identification of persons reporting under this section.


(Back to Top)

Parental Drug Use As Child Abuse
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Parental Drug Use As Child Abuse: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 324 KB) publication.

Citation: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.44.200 (LexisNexis through 12-18-08)

Statute Text:

A law enforcement agency in the course of investigating an allegation under § 69.50.401(a) relating to manufacture of methamphetamine, or an allegation under § 69.50.440 relating to possession of ephedrine or any of its salts or isomers or salts of isomers, pseudoephedrine or any of its salts or isomers or salts of isomers, pressurized ammonia gas, or pressurized ammonia gas solution with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, that discovers a child present at the site, shall contact the department immediately.

Citation: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.44.170(1) (LexisNexis through 12-18-08)

Statute Text:

When, as a result of a report of alleged child abuse or neglect, an investigation is made that includes an in-person contact with the person who is alleged to have committed the abuse or neglect, there shall be a determination of whether it is probable that the use of alcohol or controlled substances is a contributing factor to the alleged abuse or neglect.

Citation: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.42.100 (LexisNexis through 12-18-08)

Statute Text:

A person is guilty of the crime of endangerment with a controlled substance if the person knowingly or intentionally permits a dependent child or dependent adult to be exposed to, ingest, inhale, or have contact with methamphetamine or ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or anhydrous ammonia, including their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, that are being used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers. Endangerment with a controlled substance is a Class B felony.

Citation: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.605 (LexisNexis through 12-18-08)

Statute Text:

The court shall make a finding of fact of the special allegation, or if a jury trial is had, the jury shall, if it finds the defendant guilty, also find a special verdict as to the special allegation, in a criminal case in which:
The defendant has been convicted of manufacture of a controlled substance under § 69.50.401 relating to manufacture of methamphetamine; or possession of ephedrine or any of its salts or isomers or salts of isomers, pseudoephedrine or any of its salts or isomers or salts of isomers, pressurized ammonia gas, or pressurized ammonia gas solution with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, as defined in § 69.50.440.
There has been a special allegation pleaded and proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime when a person younger than age 18 was present in or upon the premises of manufacture.



(Back to Top)

Penalties for Failure to Report and False Reporting of Child Abuse and Neglect
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Penalties for Failure to Report and False Reporting of Child Abuse and Neglect: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 166 KB) publication.

Failure to Report
Rev. Code §§ 26.44.080; 9A.20.021

Every person who is required to make a report pursuant to the reporting laws and who knowingly fails to make such a report, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Every person convicted of a gross misdemeanor shall be punished by one or both of the following:

Imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 1 year
A fine of not more than $5,000


False Reporting
Rev. Code §§ 26.44.060(4); 9A.20.021

A person who intentionally and in bad faith knowingly makes a false report of alleged abuse or neglect shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Every person convicted of a misdemeanor shall be punished by one or both of the following:

Imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 90 days
A fine of not more than $1,000



(Back to Top)

Review and Expunction of Central Registries and Reporting Records
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Review and Expunction of Central Registries and Reporting Records: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 502 KB) publication.

Right of the Reported Person to Review and Challenge Records
Rev. Code § 26.44.125

A person who is named as an alleged perpetrator after October 1, 1998, in a founded report of child abuse or neglect has the right to seek review and amendment of the finding. Within 20 calendar days after receiving written notice from the Department of Social and Health Services that a person is named as an alleged perpetrator in a founded report of child abuse or neglect, he or she may request that the department review the finding. The request must be made in writing.
If a request for review is not made, the alleged perpetrator may not further challenge the finding and shall have no right to agency review, adjudicative hearing, or judicial review of the finding.

Upon receipt of a written request for review, the department shall review and, if appropriate, may amend the finding. The review must be conducted in accordance with procedures the department establishes by rule.

Upon completion of the review, the department shall notify the alleged perpetrator in writing of the agency's determination. If, following agency review, the report remains founded, the person named as the alleged perpetrator in the report may request an adjudicative hearing to contest the finding. The request for an adjudicative proceeding must be filed within 30 calendar days after receiving notice of the agency review determination. If a request for an adjudicative proceeding is not made, the alleged perpetrator may not further challenge the finding.

Reviews and hearings conducted under this section are confidential and shall not be open to the public.

When Records Must Be Expunged
Rev. Code § 26.44.031

Effective October 1, 2008

The Department of Social and Health Services shall destroy all of its records concerning:

A screened-out report within 3 years from the receipt of the report
An unfounded or inconclusive report within 6 years of completion of the investigation, unless a prior or subsequent founded report has been received regarding the child who is the subject of the report, a sibling or half-sibling of the child, or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child, before the records are destroyed



(Back to Top)

Child Welfare
Case Planning for Families Involved With Child Welfare Agencies
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Case Planning for Families Involved With Child Welfare Agencies: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 696 KB) publication.

When Case Plans Are Required
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 13.34.120; 13.34.136

To aid the court in its decision on disposition, a social study shall be made by the person or agency filing the petition. The study shall include all social files and also may include facts relating to the child's cultural heritage, and shall be made available to the court.
Whenever a child is ordered removed from the home, a permanency plan shall be developed no later than 60 days from the time the supervising agency assumes responsibility for providing services, including placing the child, or at the time of a hearing under § 13.34.130, whichever occurs first. The permanency planning process continues until a permanency planning goal is achieved or dependency is dismissed. The planning process shall include reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent's home.


Who May Participate in the Case Planning Process
Citation: Rev. Code § 13.34.120

A parent may submit a counselor's or health-care provider's evaluation of the parent, which shall either be included in the social study or considered in conjunction with the social study.
At least 10 working days before the disposition hearing, the department shall mail to the parent and his or her attorney a copy of the agency's social study and proposed service plan.
In addition, the department shall provide an opportunity for parents to review and comment on the plan at the local office closest to the parents' residence.
If the parents disagree with the agency's plan or any part thereof, the parents shall submit to the court at least 24 hours before the hearing, an alternative plan to correct the problems that led to the finding of dependency.


Contents of a Case Plan
Rev. Code §§ 13.34.136; 13.34.145

The permanency plan of care shall identify one of the following outcomes as a primary goal and may identify additional outcomes as alternative goals:
Return of the child to the home of the child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian
Adoption
Guardianship
Permanent legal custody
Long-term relative or foster care, until the child is age 18, with a written agreement between the parties and the care provider
Successful completion of a responsible living skills program
Independent living, if appropriate and if the child is age 16 or older
Unless the court has ordered that a termination petition be filed, a specific plan shall be developed to include where the child will be placed, what steps will be taken to return the child home, what steps the agency will take to promote existing appropriate sibling relationships and/or facilitate placement together or contact in accordance with the best interests of each child, and what actions the agency will take to maintain parent-child ties. All aspects of the plan shall include the goal of achieving permanence for the child.
The agency plan shall specify what services the parents will be offered to enable them to resume custody, what requirements the parents must meet to resume custody, and a time limit for each service plan and parental requirement.
A schedule of visitation between the child and the parent, when visitation is in the best interest of the child, will be developed for each plan. The agency shall encourage the maximum parent and child and sibling contact possible, when it is in the best interest of the child, including regular visitation and participation by the parents in the care of the child while the child is in placement.

A child shall be placed as close to the child's home as possible, preferably in the child's own neighborhood, unless the court finds that placement at a greater distance is necessary to promote the child's or parents' well-being.
The plan shall state whether both in-State and, when appropriate, out-of-State placement options have been considered by the department.
Unless it is not in the best interests of the child, whenever practical, the plan should ensure the child remains enrolled in the school the child was attending at the time the child entered foster care.
If the permanency plan identifies independent living as a goal, the permanency plan also shall specifically identify the services that will be provided to assist the child to make a successful transition from foster care to independent living.



(Back to Top)

Concurrent Planning for Permanency for Children
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Concurrent Planning for Permanency for Children: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 200 KB) publication.

Citation: Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.136(2)(a) & (b)(iv) (LexisNexis through Wash. 2007 Legis. Serv., Ch. 413)

Statute Text:

Whenever a child is ordered removed from the child's home, the agency charged with his or her care shall provide the court with a permanency plan of care that shall identify one of the following outcomes as a primary goal and may identify additional outcomes as alternative goals:
Return of the child to the home of the child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian
Adoption
Guardianship
Permanent legal custody
Long-term relative or foster care, until the child is age 18, with a written agreement between the parties and the care provider
Successful completion of a responsible living skills program
Independent living, if appropriate and if the child is age 16 or older
The plan shall state whether both in-State and, where appropriate, out-of-State placement options have been considered by the department.



(Back to Top)

Court Hearings for the Permanent Placement of Children
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Court Hearings for the Permanent Placement of Children: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 528 KB) publication.

Schedule of Hearings
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 13.34.134; 13.34.138; 13.34.145
Hearings to review the status of all children found dependent shall be held 6 months from the beginning of the current placement episode and every 6 months thereafter.
Permanency hearings shall be held:

No later than 12 months from the beginning of placement and every 12 months thereafter
Within 30 days if reasonable efforts to reunify are not ordered


Persons Entitled to Attend Hearings
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 13.34.070; 13.34.138; 13.34.145
Notice of a hearing shall be provided to the child if the child is age 12 or older, and to the parents, guardian, or custodian, and such other persons as appear to the court to be proper or necessary parties to the proceedings.
The supervising agency shall provide a foster parent, preadoptive parent, or relative with notice of, and their right to an opportunity to be heard in, a review hearing pertaining to the child, but only if that person is currently providing care to that child at the time of the hearing. This notice shall not be construed to grant party status to any person who has been provided an opportunity to be heard.

If the child has resided in the home of a foster parent or relative for more than 6 months prior to the permanency planning hearing, the court shall also enter a finding regarding whether the foster parent or relative was informed of the hearing as required by statute.

Determinations Made at Hearings
Citation: Rev. Code § 13.34.138; 13.34.145
At the review hearing, the court shall determine whether:

The agency is making reasonable efforts to provide services to the family to eliminate the need for placement of the child.
There has been compliance with the case plan by the child, the child's parents, and the agency supervising the placement.
Progress has been made toward correcting the problems that necessitated the child's placement in out-of-home care.
There is a continuing need for placement.
The child is in an appropriate placement that adequately meets all physical, emotional, and educational needs.
Preference has been given to placement with the child's relatives.
Both in-State and, where appropriate, out-of-State placements have been considered.
The parents have visited the child and any reasons why visitation has not occurred or has been infrequent.
At the permanency planning hearing, the court shall review the permanency plan prepared by the agency and make explicit findings regarding each of the following:

The continuing necessity for, and the safety and appropriateness of, the placement
The extent of compliance with the permanency plan by the agency and any other service providers, the child's parents, the child, and the child's guardian, if any
The extent of any efforts to involve appropriate service providers in addition to agency staff in planning to meet the special needs of the child and the child's parents
The progress toward eliminating the causes for the child's placement outside of his or her home and toward returning the child safely to his or her home or obtaining a permanent placement for the child
The date by which it is likely that the child will be returned to his or her home or placed for adoption, with a guardian or in some other alternative permanent placement


Permanency Options
Citation: Rev. Code § 13.34.145
The permanency plan shall identify one of the following outcomes as a primary goal:
Being returned safely to his or her home
Having a petition for the involuntary termination of parental rights filed on behalf of the child
Being placed for adoption
Being placed with a guardian
Being placed in the home of a fit and willing relative of the child
Being placed in some other alternative permanent placement, including independent living or long-term foster care



(Back to Top)

Criminal Background Checks for Prospective Foster and Adoptive Parents
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Criminal Background Checks for Prospective Foster and Adoptive Parents: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 553 KB) publication.

Requirements for Foster Parents
Citation: 2007 Wa. Ch. 387, § 1; Admin. Code §§ 388-06-0110; 388-06-0170; 388-06-0180

[Effective July 22, 2007]
A fingerprint-based background check through the Washington State patrol identification and criminal history section and the FBI is required when the department seeks to approve an applicant for a foster placement.
[The following is taken from the Administrative Code.] A background check is required for any individual who will have unsupervised access to children, including a person who is at least 16 years old residing in a foster home or relative's home who is not a foster child.
The department must review records of criminal convictions and pending charges, child protective service case files for founded reports of child abuse or neglect, and any civil judgments, determinations, or disciplinary board final decisions of child abuse or neglect.
A conviction for any of the crimes listed will permanently prohibit a person from being licensed. Those felony convictions include:
Child abuse and/or neglect
Spousal abuse
A crime against a child, including child pornography
A crime involving violence, including rape, sexual assault, or homicide, but not including other physical assault
The department must disqualify a person from licensure if it has been less than 5 years from a conviction for the following crimes:
Any physical assault not included above
Any sex offense not included above
Any felony conviction not included above
A felony violation of certain drug-related crimes, including unlawfully manufacturing, delivering, or possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, or unlawfully using a building for drug purposes


Requirements for Adoptive Parents
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.190; Admin. Code §§ 388-06-0110; 388-06-0170; 388-06-0180

[Effective July 22, 2007]
All preplacement reports shall include a background check of any conviction records, pending charges, or disciplinary board final decisions of prospective adoptive parents. The background check shall include a fingerprint-based background check of national crime information databases for any person being investigated. It shall also include a review of any child abuse and neglect history of any adults living in the prospective adoptive parents' home.
The background check shall include a review of the child abuse and neglect registries of all States in which the prospective adoptive parents or any other adults living in the home have lived during the previous 5 years.
[The following is taken from the Administrative Code.] A conviction for any of the crimes listed will permanently prohibit a person from being licensed. Those felony convictions include:
Child abuse and/or neglect
Spousal abuse
A crime against a child, including child pornography
A crime involving violence, including rape, sexual assault, or homicide, but not including other physical assault
Any physical assault not included above
Any sex offense not included above
Any felony conviction not included above
A felony violation of certain drug-related crimes, including unlawfully manufacturing, delivering, or possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, or unlawfully using a building for drug purposes



(Back to Top)

Determining the Best Interests of the Child
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Determining the Best Interests of the Child: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 385 KB) publication.

Citation: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.34.020 (LexisNexis through all 2007 Leg.)

Statute Text:

The legislature declares that the family unit is a fundamental resource of American life that should be nurtured. Toward the continuance of this principle, the legislature declares that the family unit should remain intact unless a child's right to conditions of basic nurture, health, or safety is jeopardized. When the rights of basic nurture, physical and mental health, and safety of the child and the legal rights of the parents are in conflict, the rights and safety of the child should prevail. In making reasonable efforts under this chapter, the child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern. The right of a child to basic nurturing includes the right to a safe, stable, and permanent home and a speedy resolution of any proceeding under this chapter.


(Back to Top)

Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 444 KB) publication.

Circumstances That Are Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights
Rev. Code §§ 13.34.132; 13.34.180

A court may order termination of parental rights if the following requirements are met:
The court has removed the child from his or her home.
Termination is recommended by the supervising agency.
Termination is in the best interests of the child.
Because of the existence of aggravated circumstances, reasonable efforts to unify the family are not required. In determining whether aggravated circumstances exist by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, the court shall consider one or more of the following:
Conviction of the parent of rape of the child
Conviction of the parent of criminal mistreatment of the child
Conviction of the parent of assault when the child is the victim
Conviction of the parent of murder, manslaughter, or homicide by abuse of the child's other parent, sibling, or another child
Conviction of the parent of attempting, soliciting, or conspiring to commit a crime listed above
A finding by a court that a parent is a sexually violent predator
Failure of the parent to complete available treatment where such failure has resulted in a prior termination of parental rights to another child and the parent has failed to effect significant change in the interim
Abandonment of an infant under age 3
Conviction of the parent of a sex offense or incest, when a child has been born of the offense


A petition seeking termination of parental rights may be filed when:

The child has been found to be a dependent child, and:
The child has been removed from the custody of the parent for at least 6 months.
Services capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided.
There is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future.
Use of intoxicating or controlled substances render the parent incapable of providing proper care for the child for extended periods of time and the parent has refused or failed to complete treatment.
The psychological incapacity or mental deficiency of the parent is so severe and chronic as to render the parent incapable of providing proper care for the child for extended periods of time.
Continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.
The whereabouts of the child's parent are unknown, and no person has acknowledged paternity or maternity and requested custody of the child within 2 months after the child was found.


Circumstances That Are Exceptions to Termination of Parental Rights
Rev. Code § 13.34.180

A parent's failure to remedy conditions for 12 months shall give rise to a presumption that there is little likelihood of reunification unless it is shown that all necessary services have not been clearly offered or provided.


(Back to Top)

Infant Safe Haven Laws
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Infant Safe Haven Laws: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 660 KB) publication.

Infant's Age
Rev. Code § 13.34.360

A newborn may be relinquished. ''Newborn'' means a live human being who is less than 72 hours old.

Who May Relinquish the Infant
Rev. Code § 13.34.360

The newborn may be relinquished by his or her parent.

Who May Receive the Infant
Rev. Code § 13.34.360

The parent may leave the infant with a qualified person at an appropriate location. ''Appropriate location'' means:
The emergency department of a licensed hospital during the hours the hospital is in operation
A fire station during its hours of operation and while fire personnel are present
''Qualified person'' means:

A bona fide employee, volunteer, or medical staff member of the hospital who represents to the parent transferring the newborn that he or she can and will summon appropriate resources to meet the newborn's immediate needs
A firefighter, volunteer, or emergency medical technician at a fire station who represents to the parent transferring the newborn that he or she can and will summon appropriate resources to meet the newborn's immediate needs


Responsibilities of the Safe Haven Provider
Rev. Code § 13.34.360

The qualified person at an appropriate location shall:
Attempt to protect the anonymity of the parent who transfers the newborn
Provide an opportunity for the parent to anonymously give such information as the parent knows about the family medical history of the parents and the newborn
Provide referral information about adoption options, counseling, appropriate medical and emotional aftercare services, domestic violence, and legal rights to the parent seeking to transfer the newborn
Notify child protective services within 24 hours after receipt of the newborn


Immunity for the Provider
Rev. Code § 13.34.360

A hospital or fire station, its employees, volunteers, and medical staff are immune from any criminal or civil liability for accepting or receiving a newborn under this section.

Protection for Relinquishing Parent
Rev. Code § 13.34.360

A parent of a newborn who transfers the newborn to a qualified person at an appropriate location is not subject to criminal liability for abandonment of a child.
The qualified person at an appropriate location shall not require the parent to provide any identifying information in order to transfer the newborn.

Effect on Parental Rights
Rev. Code § 13.34.360

Child protective services shall assume custody of the newborn within 24 hours after receipt of notification.



(Back to Top)

Online Resources for State Child Welfare Law and Policy
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Online Resources for State Child Welfare Law and Policy (PDF - 472 KB) publication.

Statutes:

Website for Statutes: http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw
Citations:

Adoption: Title 26, Chapter 26.33
Child Protection: Title 26, Chapter 26.44
Child Welfare: Title 13, Chapter 13.34; Title 26, Chapter 26.34

Regulation/Policy

Website for Administrative Code: http://apps.leg.wa.gov/wac
Note:
See Titles 112, 275, 388, 440





Website for Agency Policies: www1.dshs.wa.gov/ca/pubs/manuals.asp



Other Resources


Department of Social and Health Services, Children's Administration

Publications/Program Information Index page
www1.dshs.wa.gov/ca/pubs/programs.asp

(Back to Top)

Placement of Children With Relatives
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Placement of Children With Relatives: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 310 KB) publication.

Relative Placement for Foster Care and Guardianship
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 13.34.130; 74.15.020(2)(a)
Placement of the child with a relative under this subsection shall be given preference by the court. A relative includes a person related to the child in any of the following ways:
Any blood relative, including those of half-blood, and including first cousins, second cousins, nephews or nieces, and persons of preceding generations as denoted by prefixes of ''grand,'' ''great,'' or ''great-great''
Stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, and stepsister
A person who legally adopts a child or the child's parent, as well as the natural and other legally adopted children of such persons, and other relatives of the adoptive parents in accordance with State law
Spouses of any persons named above, even after the marriage is terminated
The relatives of any half-sibling of the child
Extended family members, as defined by the law or custom of the Indian child's Tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, a person who has reached age 18 and who is the Indian child's grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent who provides care in the family abode on a 24-hour basis to an Indian child


Requirements for Placement with Relatives
Citation: Rev. Code § 13.34.130
Unless there is reasonable cause to believe that the health, safety, or welfare of the child would be jeopardized or that efforts to reunite the parent and child will be hindered, such child shall be placed with a person who is:
Related to the child as defined in § 74.15.020(2)(a) and with whom the child has a relationship and is comfortable
Willing and available to care for the child
The relative must be suitable and competent to provide care and treatment. If the relative appears otherwise suitable and competent, a criminal history background check need not be completed before placement, but as soon as possible after placement.

Any placements with relatives shall be contingent upon cooperation by the relative with the agency case plan and compliance with court orders related to the care and supervision of the child including, but not limited to, court orders regarding parent-child contacts, sibling contacts, and any other conditions imposed by the court.

Relatives Who May Adopt

This issue is not addressed in the statutes reviewed.

Requirements for Adoption by Relatives

This issue is not addressed in the statutes reviewed.



(Back to Top)

Reasonable Efforts to Preserve or Reunify Families and Achieve Permanency for Children
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Reasonable Efforts to Preserve or Reunify Families and Achieve Permanency for Children: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 368 KB) publication.

What Are Reasonable Efforts
Citation: Rev. Code § 13.34.130
Reasonable efforts are preventive services offered or provided to the child and the child's parent.

When Reasonable Efforts Are Required
Citation: Rev. Code § 13.34.130
Reasonable efforts must be made:
To prevent or eliminate the need for the removal of the child from the home
To make it possible for the child to return home


When Reasonable Efforts Are NOT Required
Citation: Rev. Code § 13.34.132
Reasonable efforts are not required when there are aggravated circumstances. In determining whether aggravated circumstances exist by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, the court shall consider one or more of the following:
Conviction of the parent of rape, criminal mistreatment, or assault of the child
Conviction of the parent of murder, manslaughter, or homicide by abuse of the child's other parent, sibling, or another child
Conviction of the parent of attempting, soliciting, or conspiring to commit any of the above crimes
A finding by a court that a parent is a sexually violent predator
Failure of the parent to complete a treatment plan where such failure has resulted in a prior termination of parental rights to another child and the parent has failed to effect significant change in the interim
Abandonment of an infant under 3 years of age
Conviction of the parent of a sex offense or incest when the child is born of the offense



(Back to Top)

Standby Guardianship
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Standby Guardianship: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 256 KB) publication.

These issues are not addressed in statutes reviewed.
(Back to Top)

Adoption
Access to Adoption Records
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Access to Adoption Records: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 504 KB) publication.

Who May Access Information
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.33.340; 26.33.343

Nonidentifying information is available to:
An adoptive parent
An adoptee
A birth parent
Identifying information may be accessed by:

An adoptee who is age 21 or older, or under 21 with the permission of the adoptive parent
A birth parent or member of the birth parent's family after the adoptee has reached age 21
These family members shall be limited to the birth grandparents, a brother or sister of a birth parent, or the child of a birth parent. The court, for good cause shown, may allow a relative more distant in degree to petition for disclosure.

Access to Nonidentifying Information
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.33.340; 26.33.380

Reasonably available nonidentifying information may be disclosed upon a written request to the persons listed above. If the adoption facilitator refuses to disclose such information, the individual may petition the superior court.

The prospective adoptive parent shall be given a family background and child and family social history report about the child. The report shall include a chronological history of the circumstances surrounding the adoptive placement and any available psychiatric reports, psychological reports, court reports pertaining to dependency or custody, or school reports. Such reports or information shall not reveal the identity of the birth parents of the child but shall contain reasonably available nonidentifying information.

Mutual Access to Identifying Information
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.33.343; 26.33.347

Any person listed above may petition the court to appoint a confidential intermediary. The intermediary shall search for and discreetly contact the birth parent or adoptee; or if they are not alive or cannot be located within 1 year, the intermediary may attempt to locate members of the birth parents' or adoptee's family.

If the person is located, the intermediary will ask whether the person consents to a disclosure of identifying information. If the person refuses to consent, the intermediary shall report the refusal to the court and shall refrain from further inquiry without judicial approval. If the person being sought consents to disclosure of his or her identity, the court may then order that the identifying information be released. If the person being sought is deceased, the court may order disclosure of the identity of the deceased to the petitioner.

An adoptee age 18 or older may file with the Department of Health a certified statement declaring any one or more of the following:

The adoptee refuses to consent to the release of any identifying information to a birth parent, birth sibling, or other birth relative and does not wish to be contacted by a confidential intermediary except in the case of a medical need.
The adoptee consents to the release of identifying information to a confidential intermediary, a birth parent, birth sibling, or other birth relative.
The adoptee desires to be contacted by his or her birth parents, birth siblings, other birth relatives, or a confidential intermediary.
An adoptee who files a certified statement may subsequently file another statement requesting to rescind or amend the prior statement.

Access to Original Birth Certificate
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.345

A noncertified copy of the original birth certificate is available to the birth parent upon request.

For adoptions finalized after 10-1-1993, a noncertified copy is available to the adoptee who is age 18 or older, unless the birth parent has filed an affidavit of nondisclosure.

Where the Information Can Be Located

Adoption Archives, Washington Department of Social and Health Services, Children's Administration

(Back to Top)

Collection of Family Information About Adopted Persons, Birth Parents, and Adoptive Parents
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Collection of Family Information About Adopted Persons, Birth Parents, and Adoptive Parents: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 371 KB) publication.

Agency or Person Gathering Information or Preparing Report
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.33.190; 26.33.350
A preplacement report on the prospective adoptive parents may be prepared by:
A child-placing agency
The department
An individual approved by the court
A court employee
Any person, agency, or entity who places a child for adoption shall provide health and social information about the birth family to the adoptive parents.

Contents of Report About Person to be Adopted
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.33.350; 26.33.380
The information about the child shall include:

A complete medical history
The results of a physical exam with lab tests and x-rays
Family background
A chronological history of the circumstances surrounding the adoptive placement
Psychiatric and/or psychological reports
Court reports related to dependency or custody
School reports


Contents of Report About Birth Parents
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.33.350; 26.33.380
The information about the birth parents shall include:
Medical history
Any available mental or physical health history
Family background
Social history
A chronological history of the circumstances surrounding the adoptive placement


Contents of Report About Adoptive Parents
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.190
The preplacement report shall include an investigation of the adoptive parents that addresses:
The home environment
Family life
The parents' health
The parents' facilities and resources
Their fitness as parents
Their understanding of the issues associated with adoption
The results of a national and State criminal background check



(Back to Top)

Consent to Adoption
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Consent to Adoption: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 474 KB) publication.

Who Must Consent to an Adoption
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.160
Consent to an adoption shall be required of the following, if applicable:
The parents and any alleged father of a child under age 18
An agency or the department to whom the child has been relinquished pursuant to § 26.33.080
The legal guardian of the child


Age When Consent of Adoptee is Considered or Required
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.160
A child who is age 14 or older must consent to the adoption.

When Parental Consent is not Needed
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.33.120; 26.33.170
Except in the case of an Indian child, the parent-child relationship of a parent may be terminated upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the relationship, the parent has failed to perform parental duties, and is withholding consent to adoption contrary to the best interest of the child.
Except in the case of an Indian child, the parent-child relationship of an alleged father who appears and claims paternity may be terminated upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the relationship; that the alleged father has failed to perform parental duties under circumstances showing a substantial lack of regard for his parental obligations; that he is withholding consent to adoption, contrary to the best interest of the child; or that he is not the father.

The parent-child relationship of an Indian child and his or her parent or alleged father where paternity has been claimed or established may be terminated only pursuant to the standards set forth in 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).

The consent of an agency, the department, or a legal guardian may be dispensed with if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed adoption is in the best interests of the child.

The consent of an alleged father, birth parent, or parent may be dispensed with if the court finds that the proposed adoption is in the best interests of the child, and the alleged father, birth parent, or parent:

Has been found guilty of rape or incest where the child was the victim of the rape or incest
Has been found guilty of rape or incest where the other parent of the child was the victim of the rape or incest and the child was conceived as a result of the rape or incest


When Consent Can Be Executed
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.33.080; 26.33.160
A petition for relinquishment, together with the written consent to adoption, may be filed before the child's birth. If the child is an Indian child, the petition and consent shall not be signed until at least 10 days after the child's birth and shall be recorded before a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a).
The consent will not be presented to the court until 48 hours after it is signed or 48 hours after the birth of the child, whichever occurs later. In the case of a consent to an adoption of an Indian child, no consent shall be valid unless the consent is executed in writing more than 10 days after the birth of the child.

How Consent Must Be Executed
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.33.080; 26.33.160
A parent, an alleged father, the department, or an agency may file with the court a petition to relinquish a child to the department or an agency. The parent's or alleged father's written consent to adoption shall accompany the petition. The written consent of the department or the agency to assume custody shall be filed with the petition.The written consent to adoption shall be signed under penalty of perjury and shall state that:

It is given subject to approval of the court.
It has no force or effect until approved by the court.
The birth parent is or is not of Native American or Alaska native ancestry.
It is revocable by the consenting party at any time before its approval by the court.
A written consent to adoption that meets all the requirements of this chapter but that does not name or otherwise identify the adopting parent is valid if it contains a statement that it is voluntarily executed without disclosure of the name or other identification of the adopting parent.
There must be a witness to the consent of the parent or alleged father. The witness must be at least age 18 and selected by the parent or alleged father. The consent document shall contain a statement identifying by name, address, and relationship the witness selected by the parent or alleged father.


Revocation of Consent
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.160
Consent to adoption is revocable by the consenting party at any time before the consent is approved by the court. The revocation may be made in either of the following ways:
Written revocation may be delivered or mailed to the clerk of the court before approval.
Written revocation may be delivered or mailed to the clerk of the court after approval, but only if it is delivered or mailed within 48 hours after a prior notice of revocation that was given within 48 hours after the birth of the child. The prior notice of revocation shall be given to the agency or person who sought the consent and may be either oral or written.
Consent to adoption may not be revoked after it has been approved by the court. Within 1 year after approval, a consent may be revoked for fraud or duress practiced by the person, department, or agency requesting the consent, or for lack of mental competency on the part of the person giving the consent at the time the consent was given. A written consent to adoption may not be revoked more than 1 year after it is approved by the court.

In the case of consent to an adoption of an Indian child, consent may be withdrawn for any reason at any time prior to the entry of the final decree of adoption. Consent may be withdrawn for fraud or duress within 2 years of the entry of the final decree of adoption.



(Back to Top)

Court Jurisdiction and Venue for Adoption Petitions
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Court Jurisdiction and Venue for Adoption Petitions: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 233 KB) publication.

Jurisdiction
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.030
A petition for adoption may be filed in the superior court.

Venue
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.030

The petition may be filed in the county in which:
The petitioner is resident.
The adopted person is domiciled.



(Back to Top)

State Recognition of Intercountry Adoptions Finalized Abroad
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the State Recognition of Intercountry Adoptions Finalized Abroad: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 414 KB) publication.

Effect and Recognition of a Foreign Adoption Decree

This issue is not addressed in the statutes reviewed.

Readoption After an Intercountry Adoption

This issue is not addressed in the statutes reviewed.

Application for a U.S. Birth Certificate
Citation: Rev. Code § 70.58.210(2)

The Department of Registration of Births will, upon request, issue a birth certificate for a child born outside the United States who was adopted in this State, when it receives:
A certified copy of the decree of adoption
Evidence as to the child's birth date and birthplace provided by the original birth certificate, or by a certified copy, extract, or translation or by a certified copy of some other document that is essentially equivalent, such as the records of the U.S. Immigration or Naturalization Service* or of the U.S. Department of State
The certificate will include:

The new name of the child as shown in the adoption decree
The names of the adoptive parents of the child
The age, sex, and date of birth of the child
Unless the court orders otherwise, the certificate of birth shall have the same overall appearance as the certificate that would have been issued if the adopted child had been born in the State of Washington.

[*As of March 1, 2003, the responsibility for providing immigration-related services was transferred from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, a bureau of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The statutes do not yet reflect this change.]



(Back to Top)

Intestate Inheritance Rights for Adopted Children
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Intestate Inheritance Rights for Adopted Children: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 333 KB) publication.

Birth Parents in Relation to Adopted Person
Citation: Rev. Code § 11.04.085

A lawfully adopted child shall not be considered an heir of his or her natural parents.



Adoptive Parents in Relation to Adopted Person
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.260

An adopted person shall be, to all intents and purposes, and for all legal incidents, the child, legal heir, and lawful issue of the adoptive parent, entitled to all rights and privileges, including the right of inheritance.




(Back to Top)

Postadoption Contact Agreements Between Birth and Adoptive Families
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Postadoption Contact Agreements Between Birth and Adoptive Families: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 443 KB) publication.

What may be included in postadoption contact agreements?
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.295

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit the parties to a proceeding under this chapter from entering into agreements regarding communication with or contact between adopted children, adoptive parents, and a birth parent or parents.

Who may be a party to a postadoption contact agreement?
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.295

An agreement may entered into between the adoptive parents and the birth parents.

What is the role of the court in postadoption contact agreements?
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.295

The court shall not enter a proposed order unless the terms of such order have been approved in writing by the prospective adoptive parents, any birth parent whose parental rights have not previously been terminated, and, if the child is in the custody of the department or a licensed child-placing agency, a representative of the department or child-placing agency. If the child is represented by an attorney or guardian ad litem in a proceeding under this chapter or in any other child-custody proceeding, the terms of the proposed order also must be approved in writing by the child's representative. An agreement under this section need not disclose the identity of the parties to be legally enforceable.
The court shall not enter a proposed order unless the court finds that the communication or contact between the child adoptee, the adoptive parents, and a birth parent or parents as agreed upon and as set forth in the proposed order, would be in the adopted child’s best interests.

Are agreements legally enforceable?
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.295

Agreements regarding communication with or contact between adopted children, adoptive parents, and a birth parent or parents shall not be legally enforceable unless the terms of the agreement are set forth in a written court order entered in accordance with the provisions of this section.

An agreement may be enforced by a civil action and the prevailing party in that action may be awarded, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees.

An agreement under this section need not disclose the identity of the parties to be legally enforceable.

Failure to comply with the terms of an agreed order regarding communication or contact that has been entered by the court pursuant to this section shall not be grounds for setting aside an adoption decree or revocation of a written consent to an adoption after that consent has been approved by the court as provided in this chapter.

How may an agreement be terminated or modified?
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.295

The court shall not modify an agreed order under this section unless it finds that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child adoptee, and that:

The modification is agreed to by the adoptive parent and the birth parent or parents.
Exceptional circumstances have arisen since the agreed order was entered that justify modification of the order.



(Back to Top)

Regulation of Private Domestic Adoption Expenses
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Regulation of Private Domestic Adoption Expenses: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 592 KB) publication.

Birth Parent Expenses Allowed
Citation: Rev. Code § 9A.64.030(2)(f)

A person receiving a child for adoption is permitted to pay:
The prenatal hospital or medical expenses involved in the birth of the child
Attorneys' fees and court costs involved in effectuating transfer of child custody


Birth Parent Expenses Not Allowed
Citation:

This issue is not addressed in the statutes reviewed.

Allowable Payments for Arranging Adoption
Citation:

This issue is not addressed in the statutes reviewed.

Allowable Payments for Relinquishing Child
Citation: Rev. Code § 9A.64.030(1)
It is unlawful for any person to sell or purchase a minor child.

Allowable Fees Charged by Department/Agency
Citation: Rev. Code §§ 26.33.190(4); 26.33.200(2)
An agency, the department, or a court-approved individual may charge a reasonable fee based on the time spent in conducting the home study and preparing the preplacement report. The court may set a reasonable fee for conducting the study and preparing the report when a court employee has prepared the report. An agency, the department, a court-approved individual, or the court may reduce or waive the fee if the financial condition of the person requesting the report so warrants.
A fee may be charged for preparation of the postplacement report in the same manner as for a preplacement report.

Accounting of Expenses Required by Court
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.190(4)
The fee charged by an agency, department, or court-approved individual is subject to review by the court upon request of the person requesting the report.



(Back to Top)

Rights of Presumed (Putative) Fathers, The
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Rights of Presumed (Putative) Fathers, The: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 925 KB) publication.

Legal definition of "father"
Rev. Code §§ 26.26.011; 26.26.116

''Acknowledged father'' means a man who has established a father-child relationship under §§ 26.26.300 through 26.26.375.
''Adjudicated father'' means a man who has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the father of a child.

''Alleged father'' means a man who alleges himself to be, or is alleged to be, the genetic father or a possible genetic father of a child, but whose paternity has not been determined. The term does not include:

A presumed father
A man whose parental rights have been terminated or declared not to exist
A male donor
''Presumed father'' means a man who, under § 26.26.116, is recognized to be the father of a child until that status is rebutted or confirmed in a judicial proceeding.

A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:

He and the mother of the child are married to each other, and the child is born during the marriage.
He and the mother of the child were married to each other, and the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is terminated.
Before the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other, even if the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is born during the invalid marriage or within 300 days after its termination.
After the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child have married each other, whether or not the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and he voluntarily asserted his paternity of the child, and:
The assertion is in a record filed with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics.
He agreed to be and is named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate.
He promised in a record to support the child as his own.


Putative father registry
Rev. Code §§ 26.26.300; 26.26.305

The mother of a child and a man claiming to be the father of the child conceived as the result of his sexual intercourse with the mother may sign an acknowledgment of paternity with intent to establish the man's paternity.
An acknowledgment of paternity must:

Be in a record
Be signed under penalty of perjury by the mother and by the man seeking to establish his paternity
State that the child whose paternity is being acknowledged:
Does not have a presumed father, or has a presumed father whose full name is stated
Does not have another acknowledged or adjudicated father
State whether there has been genetic testing and, if so, that the acknowledging man's claim of paternity is consistent with the results of the testing
State that the signatories understand that the acknowledgment is the equivalent of a judicial adjudication of paternity of the child and that a challenge to the acknowledgment is permitted only under limited circumstances and is barred after 2 years


Alternate means to establish paternity
Rev. Code § 26.26.101

The father-child relationship is established between a child and a man by:
An unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity of the child under § 26.26.116
The man's having signed an acknowledgment of paternity, unless the acknowledgment has been rescinded or successfully challenged
An adjudication of the man's paternity
Adoption of the child by the man
The man's having consented to assisted reproduction by his wife that resulted in the birth of the child
A valid surrogate parentage contract, under which the father is an intended parent of the child


Required Information
Rev. Code § 26.26.355

The State Registrar of Vital Statistics shall prescribe forms for the acknowledgment of paternity. The acknowledgment of paternity shall state, in prominent lettering, that signing the acknowledgment of paternity is equivalent to an adjudication of paternity and confers upon the acknowledged father all the rights and duties of a parent, such as the payment of child support, if the acknowledgment is not challenged or rescinded.

Revocation of claim to paternity
Rev. Code §§ 26.26.330; 26.26.335

A signatory may rescind an acknowledgment of paternity by commencing a court proceeding to rescind before the earlier of:
60 days after the effective date of the acknowledgment
The date of the first hearing in a proceeding to which the signatory is a party before a court to adjudicate an issue relating to the child, including a proceeding that establishes support
After the period for rescission has elapsed, a signatory of an acknowledgment of paternity may commence a proceeding to challenge the acknowledgment only:

On the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact
Within 2 years after the acknowledgment is filed with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics
A party challenging an acknowledgment of paternity has the burden of proof.

Access to information
Rev. Code § 26.26.360

The State Registrar of Vital Statistics may release information relating to the acknowledgment of paternity, not expressly sealed under a court order, to:

A signatory of the acknowledgment or their attorneys of record
The courts of this or any other State
The agencies of this or any other State operating a child support program under title IV-D of the Social Security Act
The agencies of this or any other State involved in a dependency determination for a child named in the acknowledgment of paternity



(Back to Top)

Use of Advertising and Facilitators in Adoptive Placements
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Use of Advertising and Facilitators in Adoptive Placements: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 282 KB) publication.

Use of Advertisement
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.400(1)-(2)

No person or entity shall cause to be published for circulation, or broadcast on a radio or television station an advertisement of a child or children offered or wanted for adoption, or shall hold himself or herself out through such advertisement as having the ability to place, locate, dispose, or receive a child or children for adoption unless such person or entity is:
A duly authorized agent, contractee, or employee of the department or a children's agency or institution licensed by the department to care for and place children
A person who has a completed preplacement report with a favorable recommendation as to the fitness of the person to be an adoptive parent
Nothing in this section prohibits an attorney from advertising his or her availability to practice or provide services to the adoption of children.



Use of Intermediaries/Facilitators
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.390(2)-(3)

Any person adopting a child shall receive from the adoption facilitator written information on adoption-related services. This information may be that published by the department or any other social service provider and shall include information about how to find and evaluate appropriate adoption therapists, and may include other resources for adoption-related issues.

Any person involved in providing adoption-related services shall respond to requests for written information by providing materials explaining adoption procedures, practices, policies, fees, and services.

(Back to Top)

Who May Adopt, Be Adopted, or Place a Child for Adoption
To better understand this issue and to view it across States, see the Who May Adopt, Be Adopted, or Place a Child for Adoption: Summary of State Laws (PDF - 302 KB) publication.

Who May Adopt
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.140
Any person who is legally competent and age 18 or older may adopt.

Who May Be Adopted
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.140
Any person, regardless of age or residence, may be adopted.

Who May Place a Child for Adoption
Citation: Rev. Code § 26.33.160
A child may be placed for adoption by:
The child's parent or guardian
The department
A child-placing agency